Andreas Blume

Economics Department Head
McClelland Professor of Economics


Ph.D. in Economics, University of California, San Diego, 1989

Areas of Expertise

  • Game Theory
  • Microeconomics


ECON 696U Game Theory
ECON 501C Micro Theory III
ECON 431 Games and Decisions

Current Research

Andreas Blume's current research focus is on using game theoretic and experimental  methods to study strategic communication with imperfectly shared languages, through noisy channels, with costly messages and on organizational coordination in  environments with limited or no communication.


  • "Language Barriers," (2013) Econometrica 81, 781-812. (with Oliver Board)
  • “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation,” (2009) American Economic Review, 99, 1178-1205. (with John Duffy and April Franco)
  •  “Noisy Talk,” (2007) Theoretical Economics, 2, 395–440. (with Oliver Board)
  •  “Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language,”  (2000) Journal of Economic Theory, 95, 1–36.
  • “Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games,” (1998) American Economic Review, 88, 1323–1340 (with Douglas V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle)

Other Selected Publications

  • “A Class of Strategy-Correlated Equilibria in Sender-Receiver Games,” (2012) Games and Economic Behavior 75, 510-517.
  • “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: An Experimental Study,” (2010) Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 488-511. (with Uri Gneezy)
  • “All Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction,” (2009) Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 729–741. (with Paul Heidhues, Jonathan Lafky, Johannes MÜnster and Meixia Zhang)
  • “The Effects of Costless Pre-play Communication: Experimental Evidence from Games with Pareto-ranked Equilibria,” (2007) Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 274–290. ( with Andreas Ortmann)
  • “Private Monitoring in Auctions,” (2006) Journal of Economic Theory,131, 179–211. (with Paul Heidhues)
  • “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Language,” (2005) Theory and Decision, 57, 265–285.